Evidence for Continuous Mediation in Facial Recognition: Implications for Theories of Eyewitness Memory by McAdoo, Ryan










EVIDENCE FOR CONTINUOUS MEDIATION IN FACIAL RECOGNITION: 









SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY 
 

























EVIDENCE FOR CONTINUOUS MEDIATION IN FACIAL RECOGNITION: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORIES OF EYEWITNESS MEMORY 
 
 
A THESIS APPROVED FOR THE 






































































© Copyright by RYAN M. MCADOO 2016 
All Rights Reserved.
	 iv 
Table of Contents  
 
List of Tables.....................................................................................................................ii 
 





 Discrete State and Continuous Models of Recognition Memory...........................3 
 Mediation and Relative-Absolute Judgment Theory.............................................7 













 Other Tests of Relative Judgment Theory...........................................................21 






List of Tables  
 
Table 1. 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Choices and c2 Values from Experiments 1 and 2....................14 
	 vi 
List of Figures  
 
Figure 1. Depiction of 1HT Model....................................................................................5 
 
Figure 2. Depiction of SDT Model....................................................................................6 
 




It has been proposed that sequential lineups are superior to simultaneous lineups 
because simultaneous lineups promote comparisons amongst choices (a relative 
judgment strategy) and sequential lineups reduce this propensity by inducing 
comparisons of lineup members directly to memory rather than to each other (an 
absolute judgment strategy). The relative-absolute judgment theory implicates both 
discrete-state and continuous mediation of facial recognition memory decisions. Kellen 
and Klauer (2014) utilized a ranking task as a critical test between continuous and 
discrete-state models and found evidence that recognition memory is mediated by 
continuous evidence. We utilized the same ranking task using faces (rather than words) 
as stimuli, and found evidence of continuous mediation when study and test stimuli 
match (Experiment 1) and when they mismatch (Experiment 2). This evidence raises 
issues for relative-absolute judgment theory as an explanation supporting the superiority 
of sequential lineups. It also forces reconsideration of the role that guessing might play 
in eyewitness identification. Future research should attempt to understand the situations 
and emergent strategies that might influence when recognition is continuously or 
discretely mediated.  
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Evidence for Continuous Mediation in Facial Recognition: Implications for Theories of 
Eyewitness Identification 
Faulty eyewitness identification has contributed to the wrongful conviction of 
hundreds of innocent men and women, playing a role in 72% of DNA exoneration cases 
litigated by the Innocence Project (Innocence Project, 2015). Understanding the factors 
that influence these mistaken identifications is of great theoretical and practical interest. 
One such factor concerns the use of simultaneous or sequential lineups. But our goal 
here is not to evaluate the empirical evidence marshaled for and against sequential 
lineups (see Clark, Moreland, & Gronlund, 2014; Steblay, Dysart, & Wells, 2011; for a 
recent review see Gronlund, Mickes, Wixted, & Clark, 2015). Rather, our goal is to 
investigate a theoretical conceptualization proposed to explain the functioning of 
simultaneous and sequential lineups. 
The typical procedure in studies of eyewitness identification (ID) involves 
presenting participants with a mock crime scenario (usually a video) followed by a 
delay. Participants are then shown either a target present lineup, containing the guilty 
suspect from the video and five known innocents (fillers), or a target absent lineup, 
containing a designated innocent suspect and five fillers. If the guilty suspect is 
identified from a target present lineup, it is counted as a correct ID. If the innocent 
suspect is identified from a target absent lineup, it is counted as a false ID. In a 
simultaneous lineup, eyewitnesses view an array of (typically six) faces presented all at 
once and are tasked with identifying who they believe to be the suspect. In a sequential 
lineup, faces are presented one at a time and eyewitnesses are asked to either identify 
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the face as the suspect and terminate the lineup, or reject the face and view the next face 
in the sequence. This continues until the suspect is identified or all faces are rejected. 
Lindsay and Wells (1985) were the first to compare the sequential and 
simultaneous lineup procedures. In their study, participants given a simultaneous lineup 
had a correct ID rate of .58 and a false ID rate of .43. Participants shown a sequential 
lineup had a correct ID rate of .50 and false ID rate of .17. Lindsay and Wells concluded 
that sequential lineups were superior to simultaneous lineups. To explain this result, 
Lindsay and Wells suggested that simultaneous lineups promote the use of relative 
judgments. Wells first proposed this idea, stating that “the term relative judgment refers 
to the fact that the witness seems to be choosing the lineup member who most 
resembles the witnesses’ memory relative to other lineup members” (Wells, 1984, p. 
92). According to this idea, witnesses who view all the faces in a simultaneous lineup 
compare the faces of a lineup relative to each other and choose the member that best 
matches the witness’s memory1. Relative judgments can be contrasted with an absolute 
judgment strategy, in which witnesses compare faces (typically in a sequential lineup) 
directly to memory rather than to each other. Lindsay and Wells concluded that a 
relative judgment strategy is not necessarily harmful in target present lineups, but leads 
to higher rates of false IDs in target absent lineups. Lindsay and Wells (1985) argued 
that a sequential lineup would reduce the propensity to use a relative judgment strategy, 
and that this would result in a lowering of the false ID rate but would have little ill 
																																																						
1 It is important to note that we refer to the term “relative judgment” as the explanation 
described by Lindsay and Wells and not the act of comparing faces in a lineup. In fact, 
as we discuss later, comparing faces can have beneficial effects on eyewitness 
performance (Wixted & Mickes, 2014). We will refer to the latter as comparative 
judgments to keep this idea separate from the relative judgments as an explanation.  
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effect on the correct ID rate. This led to their recommendation to use the sequential 
lineup in real-world settings in order to protect the innocent from being chosen from 
lineups. This recommendation has been accepted by many policymakers, as has the 
relative-absolute theory that supports it (Innocence Project, 2015; Wells et al., 1998).  
Wells, Steblay, and Dysart (2012) furthered the argument for sequential lineup 
administration by suggesting that simultaneous lineups have a large proportion of 
“illegitimate” hits due to ‘lucky guesses’ of the suspect (Penrod, Garcia, & Robertson, 
2005). According to Wells et al., relative judgments occur when “…the witness is 
unable to answer the difficult question (“Is this the culprit”) and instead shifts to an 
easier question (“Which is the closest?)” (p. 268). They claim that this increases the 
number of guesses, whereby any resulting choices of the suspect (i.e., hits) arise from a 
chance process. In other words, if eyewitnesses cannot detect that a suspect is present, 
they shift to making a guess, whereby a choice is made at random from among the 
remaining lineup members. Absolute judgments mitigate these lucky guesses, making 
the sequential lineup more reliable.  
However, one must caution that the relative-absolute judgment theory is based 
on intuitive reasoning rather than a formal model of recognition memory. As such, the 
processes that mediate a relative or absolute judgment strategy are not well defined. The 
goal of this paper is to elucidate how eyewitness memory is mediated through the 
exploration of formal conceptualizations of recognition memory and, as a result, be 
better equipped to evaluate the relative-absolute judgment theory advocated by Wells 
and colleagues. The language of Lindsay and Wells’ (1985) relative-absolute judgment 
theory, and Wells, Steblay, and Dysart’s (2012) update, appear to invoke two different 
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conceptualizations of recognition memory: discrete-state and continuous mediation. We 
begin with a short description of each. We then outline the tenets of the relative-
absolute judgment theory that fit into each of these conceptualizations. Next, we report 
two studies that empirically evaluate which conceptualization (discrete-state or 
continuous) mediates facial recognition. Based on our evidence, we will then reevaluate 
the relative-absolute judgment theory and broader implications for theories of 
eyewitness identification.  
Discrete-State and Continuous Models of Recognition  
 One class of models of recognition memory is consistent with discrete-state 
mediation conceptualizations of recognition memory (e.g., Rouder & Morey, 2009). 
This conceptualization assumes that items can be in one of two states in memory that 
affect their probability of being correctly recognized and classified as “Old” or “New.” 
The simplest model of discrete-state mediation is a single high-threshold (1HT) model. 
Under this model, Old items can be in either a detect or guess state. In the detect state, 
Old items are able to be correctly classified as “Old.” If a stimulus is not detected as 
“Old” it enters a guess state in which no mnemonic information about the item is 
available, and it can either be guessed as “Old” or guessed as “New”. According to the 
1HT model, New items can only enter a guess state, from whence it can be guessed 
“Old” (a false alarm) or guessed “New” (a correct rejection).  
To extend the conceptualization of discrete-state mediation to the eyewitness 
memory situation consider the showup situation, where only one face is presented to the 
witness. A witness is tasked with either identifying the face as the suspect or rejecting 
the face. The Old item in this case would be a guilty suspect. When presented a target 
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present showup (which includes the guilty suspect), the witness will either detect the 
guilty suspect as “Old” (and make a correct ID with probability DO), or fail to detect the 
suspect and guess, either guessing that the suspect is “Old” and making a correct ID 
(with probability g), or guessing that the suspect is “New” and rejecting the lineup (with 
probability 1 – g) (see Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1. Showup decision process under the 1HT model. In a target present showup, 
the guilty suspect can be detected as “Old”, a correct ID, or guessed as “Old”, a correct 
ID, or “New”, a false rejection.  
 
 The second model of interest invokes continuously mediated processes 
underlying recognition memory. We focus on signal detection theory (SDT, e.g., 
Macmillan & Creelman, 2005) as an exemplar of this class. SDT assumes that all items, 
both Old and New, possess latent strength values. These strength values vary 
continuously, and are commonly depicted by normal distributions, whereby most items 
have similar (average) levels of strength, but some items are very strong and some are 
very weak. When items are studied, the strengths of these items increase, and the 
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distribution of Old item strengths shifts, resulting in two overlapping distributions of 
strengths that characterize New and Old items. These distributions can vary in degree of 
overlap depending on how well Old items have been encoded (see Figure 2). At study, 
the strengths of tested items are compared to a decision criterion (c). Items that fall 
above c are classified as “Old” and items that fall below c are classified as “New.” 
 
Figure 2. Depiction of SDT. New and Old items fall in two separate distributions of 
strength values. Tested items that fall above the criterion value (c) will be labeled “Old” 
and those that fall below c will be labeled “New.” The top panel indicates a situation in 
which Old items have been encoded weakly, indicated by the large degree of overlap of 
the New and Old distributions. The bottom panel indicates a situation in which Old 
items have been encoded strongly, and the distributions have separated further.  
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To illustrate, consider again the showup. When an eyewitness is presented with 
a guilty or innocent suspect, SDT posits that a suspect that falls above c will be 
classified as “Old” and a suspect that falls below c will be classified as “New.” If a 
guilty suspect in a target present showup falls above c, it will be classified as “Old” and 
the witness will make a correct ID. If the guilty suspect falls below c, it will be 
classified as “New” and the witness will make a false rejection. Conversely, if an 
innocent suspect from a target absent showup falls above c, it will be classified as “Old” 
and the witness will make a false ID; if it falls below c, it will be classified as “New” 
and the witness will make a correct rejection.  
Mediation and Relative-Absolute Judgment Theory  
 We begin this section by reiterating that the relative-absolute judgment theory is 
a verbal, rather than a formal theory. That means that there are no explicit references to 
the formal recognition models we just outlined. Nevertheless, we can attempt to map 
this theory onto these formal models. 
Wells et al. (2012) argued “the higher rate of hits from the simultaneous lineup 
is actually just the result of lucky guesses stemming from a higher rate of choosing” (p. 
268, emphasis added). This language suggests discrete-state mediation. In support of 
this discrete-state interpretation, Clark (2012) wrote, regarding the relative judgment 
strategy, that “…it assumes an all or nothing theory of memory, in which the witness 
makes a recognition decision based on a true memory, or he or she simply guesses…” 
(p. 281). Moreover, in a simultaneous lineup, one could conceptualize the “shift” from 
asking who the culprit is to who is closest, as similar to failing to detect the target in a 
basic recognition task. If the culprit is not known, and participants 
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 utilize relative judgments, they are, according to Wells et al., guessing, and any hits 
that arise in this manner are considered illegitimate. This shift in the decision process 
occurs when the guilty suspect fails to exceed a threshold of recognition (a discrete-
state assumption), leading to the use of relative judgments.  
Still, other facets of relative-absolute judgment theory suggest continuous 
mediation. Wells (1984) states that “absolute processing implies that a match (i.e., 
between a lineup member and one’s recollection of the perpetrator) must exceed some 
cut-off in order to produce an identification response” (p. 95). This language is 
reminiscent of a continuously mediated model because absolute judgments appear to 
involve the comparison of lineup members to memory, much as a strength value is 
compared to a criterion in SDT. In fact, using SDT, Wixted and Mickes (2014) argued 
that the absolute-relative judgment theory reflected changes in response bias, or the 
willingness to choose a suspect from a lineup. Specifically, when faces are presented in 
isolation (sequentially), there is less pressure to choose the face, and a more 
conservative criterion is adopted. However, when faces are presented simultaneously, 
there is more pressure to choose, and the criterion is pushed to a more liberal level, 
increasing the likelihood that a filler is chosen. Response bias refers to placement of 
criterion, and is a basic tenet of SDT; this idea does not fit a discrete-state 
conceptualization because there is nothing to weigh evidence against in discrete models.  
These disparate conceptualizations of relative judgment theory are a concern 
because in order for a theory to be useful, it must be clearly specified. Consequently, the 
goal of this paper is to empirically test discrete-state and continuous model predictions 
using a task similar to eyewitness identification. In doing so, we aim to better 
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understand the mediation that drives these decisions and better inform theory. We are 
not examining the purported sequential lineup superiority per se, rather we are 
examining the theory used to justify it, and will return to its legitimacy in light of 
evidence for discrete-state or continuous mediation.   
Empirical Evidence for Discrete-State and Continuous Mediation  
Empirical evidence favors continuously mediated models for recognition of 
verbal materials. These studies typically use receiver operating characteristic (ROC) 
analysis as the main supporting evidence (Yonelinas & Parks, 2007). ROC curves are 
constructed by plotting the hit rate and false alarm rate at each level of response bias 
(i.e., willingness to label an item as “Old”). Response bias is often assessed using 
confidence judgments (Yonelinas & Parks, 2007; Wixted, 2007), with high confidence 
signaling a more conservative response bias and low confidence signaling a more liberal 
response bias. Discrete state and continuous models make different predictions about 
the shape of these ROC curves. Specifically, discrete state mediation predicts linear 
ROCs, whereas continuous mediation predicts curvilinear ROCs. Empirical evidence 
almost always produces curvilinear ROC curves (Wixted, 2007), supporting a 
continuous mediation of recognition memory.  
However, it has been argued (e.g., Malmberg, 2002; Broder & Shutz, 2009; 
Province & Rouder, 2012; but see Chen, Starns, & Rotello, 2015) that the predictions 
made by discrete state models for ROC curves can mirror empirical evidence. Province 
and Rouder refer specifically to the effect of relaxing the certainty assumption (Luce, 
1963). The certainty assumption posits that under discrete state mediation, all “detect” 
items are recognized with high confidence and only “guess” items can be recognized 
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with a range of low to high confidence. This assumption leads to the linear ROCs that 
the model predicts. However, Province and Rouder showed that if you relax the 
certainty assumption and allow for the possibility that detected items can be recognized 
with a broader range of confidence, a discrete state model can indeed predict curvilinear 
ROCs. Recently, Kellen, Erdfelder, Malmbert, Dubé, and Criss (in press) showed that 
an alternative discrete model (low-threshold model, Luce, 1963), which assumes that 
new items can exceed a threshold for detection, also can approximate empirical ROC 
curves. Therefore, ROC analysis is unable to definitively test between discrete state and 
continuous mediation.  
If ROC analysis will not distinguish between continuous and discrete mediation, 
another measure is needed. Kellen and Klauer (2014) provided one such measure. In 
their study, participants were presented with a list of 270 words; 135 words were 
presented once (weak encoding, W) and 135 words were presented three times (strong 
encoding, S). At test, participants were presented with three-word, target present arrays 
(their Experiment 2) and were told to rank each of the words from Most likely to have 
been seen before to Least likely to have been seen before. The critical measure was the 
conditional probability that the actually-studied target of the array was ranked second, 
given that it was not chosen as most likely to have been seen before (c2).  
The c2 measure requires minimal assumptions (in contrast to ROC analysis). For 
example, the certainty assumption has no effect on c2. Moreover, c2 evaluates the most 
fundamental prediction of discrete and continuous models. In a discrete state model, 
although strong items would be more likely to be ranked first (DOS > DOW), if a strong 
target was not identified as old, it would have an equal likelihood of being ranked 
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second or third because judgments regarding these items must arise from the guess 
state. In a guess state, the amount of mnemonic information is 0, regardless of whether 
the tested item actually was strong or weak. This leads to equal c2 predictions for strong 
versus weak items, even though the average hit rate of strong items (strong items ranked 
first) would be greater than the average hit rate of weak items. According to a 
continuous model, however, strong items, on average, have a greater strength than weak 
items. Therefore, if a strong target was not ranked first, it would nevertheless have a 
greater likelihood of being ranked second than a weak target because it would fall 
higher (on average) in the target distribution (see Kellen & Klauer, 2014, for proofs). In 
sum, the predictions regarding c2 under a discrete state model are: c2S = c2W, but 
predictions regarding c2 under a continuous model are: c2S > c2W. Using words as their 
stimuli, Kellen and Klauer (2014) found evidence supporting a continuous model (c2S = 
0.63 > c2W = 0.55, Exp. 2).  
In order to evaluate the theory of relative versus absolute judgments, we utilized 
the same paradigm and c2 measure as Kellen and Klauer (2014) to test whether memory 
for faces is mediated by continuous or discrete processes. There is theoretical and 
practical merit in using faces rather than words as our critical stimuli. For example, 
words are processed and encoded differently than faces. Olivares et al. (2003) found 
evidence of separate linguistic and non-linguistic event-related potentials (ERPs) when 
comparing the N400 component using facial and non-facial stimuli, which suggests that 
the brain processes these stimuli differently at the neural level. Additionally, separate, 
specialized modules used in the processing of faces and visual words have been 
identified using fMRI (Kanwisher, 2010). These studies suggest that recognition and 
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processing of faces and words are not homologous at all levels. Additionally, 
eyewitness tasks, inside and out of the laboratory, require encoding and recognizing 
novel faces, which differs from encoding and recognizing known words.  
Our study tests two possible hypotheses. First, Kellen and Klauer (2014) found 
evidence of continuous mediation for words in a ranking task, adding to the body of 
ROC evidence suggesting that recognition memory is driven by continuous mediation. 
Our study could replicate these findings, and extend Kellen and Klauer’s results to 
faces. Alternatively, the evidence indicating that faces are processed differently from 
words suggests the possibility that recognition of faces may be mediated differently 
than words (e.g., by discrete state mediation). Experiment 1 sought to elucidate the use 




 Participants were 53 undergraduates who participated in the study in exchange 
for course credit in an introductory psychology course.  
Procedure  
Faces were arbitrarily chosen to be either targets or fillers, and all 53 
participants saw the same 100 unique targets at study. During the study phase, 
participants were instructed that they would be presented with a series of faces, one 
after another, and should try to memorize each face. After indicating they understood 
the instructions, participants viewed 100 male Caucasian faces (aged 20 – 40 years) for 
1000 ms each, separated by 500 ms inter-stimulus fixation crosses. Fifty of these faces 
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were presented once and fifty were presented a total of three non-sequential times, for a 
total of 200 study events. All 200 events were presented in a random order, and 
conditions were counterbalanced between even and odd numbered participants such that 
odd numbered participants studied faces once that even numbered participants studied 
three times, and vice versa. 
 Following the study phase, participants completed twenty arithmetic problems 
as a distractor. Participants were instructed that three two-digit numbers would be 
presented to them and that the first two numbers may or may not add up to the third. 
Participants were told to press “Y” on their keyboard if the first two numbers added up 
to the third number, or “N” if it did not. After indicating they had read and understood 
the instructions, participants viewed the 20 distractor problems.  
 Following the distractor, participants began the test phase. Participants were 
instructed that they would be presented with an array of three faces, only one of which 
had been studied before (the target), and that the position of the studied face would be 
random. Instructions indicated that the participants were to rank each face from (1st) 
most likely to have been seen before to (3rd) least likely to have been seen before. Once 
participants indicated that they had read and understood the directions for the test phase, 
the arrays were presented.  
 Each array consisted of three faces presented in a row in the middle of the 
screen with three check boxes under each face that read “1st” “2nd” and “3rd.” 
Instructions at the top of the screen reminded participants to rank each face from 1st – 
most likely, to 3rd – least likely, and to only provide one rank per face. After checking 
the appropriate ranking under each face, participants were allowed to change their 
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rankings until they indicated that their rankings were final and moved on to the next 
array. Each participant completed a total of 100 test trials, 50 with weak targets and 50 
with strong targets.  
Results  
 In order to verify that the encoding manipulation worked, we compared the 
average hit rate (i.e., targets ranked 1st) for the weak targets to the average hit rate for 
the strong targets using a dependent t-test. The average hit rate of the strong targets (M 
= .71, SD = 0.16) was significantly greater than the average hit rate of the weak targets 
(M = .52, SD = 0.15) (t(52) = -10.38, p < .001). This indicates that faces studied three 
times were encoded better than those studied once. Proportions of the target ranked 1st, 
2nd, and 3rd were calculated for each participant and the means are reported in Table 1.  
Table 1  
Proportion of Weak and Strong Targets Ranked 1st, 2nd, and 3rd and c2 Values for 
Experiments 1 and 2  
 
Exp. 1 1st 2nd 3rd c2 
Weak .52 .26 .22 .55 
Strong .71 .18 .12 .62 
Exp. 2 1st 2nd 3rd c2 
Weak .45 .31 .23 .57 
Strong .61 .24 .15 .61 
 
 Critically, we were interested in the conditional probability of targets ranked 2nd 
given they were not ranked 1st. Consequently, c2 was calculated for strong and weak 
conditions for each participant. A dependent t-test indicated that average c2S (M = .62, 
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SD = 0.15) was significantly greater than average c2W(M = .55, SD = 0.11) (t(52) = 2.82, 
p < .01). A non-parametric test (Wilcoxon signed-rank test) reached a similar 
conclusion, indicating that c2S was significantly greater than c2W (V = 375.5, p < .01). 
Cohen’s effect size (d = 0.54) indicated a moderate effect. Results supported the 
hypothesis that face recognition is continuously mediated, substantiated by the finding 
that c2S was greater than c2W. A Bayesian t-test using an effect size of .54 revealed 
substantial evidence (BF = 5.86) favoring the alternative hypothesis.  
Discussion  
 The findings provide supporting evidence for the continuous mediation of 
recognition memory for facial stimuli. However, stronger evidence for continuous 
mediation in eyewitness situations would take the form of continuous c2 patterns (c2S > 
c2W) when there is a mismatch of faces between study and test. When an eyewitness 
views a crime, the face he or she encodes is not a direct match to the face seen in a 
subsequent identification procedure. Therefore, it is important to establish that the 
evidence for continuous mediation in Experiment 1 replicates in a more externally valid 
situation. Therefore, we sought to generalize the Experiment 1 results by implementing 
a mismatch similar to what real eyewitnesses to a crime would experience.  To 
accomplish this, we ran a second experiment in which the same individuals were seen at 
study and test, but the photos of these individuals differed in facial expression and in the 








 Participants were 115 undergraduate students (84 female) between the ages of 
18 and 25 (M = 18.6, SD = 1.20) who received credit in an introductory psychology 
course in exchange for participation.  
Procedure   
 Before the experiment began, participants were presented with a short practice 
session. We implemented this practice session to ensure that participants understood the 
task before our critical data were collected. The practice phase exactly matched the 
study and test phases in all respects except for the use of female target faces and the 
exclusion of a distractor task. Participants studied five female Caucasian faces (aged 20 
– 40) for 1250 ms, with 500 ms inter-stimulus fixation point, followed by two practice 
test trials with instructions identical to the actual test phase.  
 Following the practice phase, participants began the experiment. Participants 
were instructed that they would view a series of faces and should memorize these faces. 
Once they indicated that they understood the instructions, 100 male faces were 
presented in a randomized order for 1250 ms each, interspersed with a 500 ms inter-
stimulus fixation point. Fifty faces were presented once in the weak encoding condition, 
and fifty faces were presented three non-sequential times in the strong encoding 
condition, for a total of 200 study events. There were 30 Caucasian faces and 20 
African American faces at each level of encoding. All 100 unique study faces wore 
smiles and street clothes. The faces rotated through the two encoding conditions as in 
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Experiment 1, and, like Experiment 1, faces were arbitrarily chosen to be either targets 
or fillers before the experiment was conducted.  
 After viewing all 200 study events, participants completed a distractor task. The 
distractor task was identical to Experiment 1 except 40 math questions were completed. 
Following the distractor and before the test phase began, participants were given the 
same instructions as in Experiment 1. After indicating that they had read and understood 
the instructions, participants began the test phase.  
 Arrays contained one target (either weak or strong) and two new faces presented 
in a row in the center of the screen. The faces for each array were randomly selected 
(the target from the pre-determined pool of targets, and the fillers from the pre-
determined pool of fillers), and the position of the target was randomly determined for 
each test trial. In addition, Caucasian and African American arrays were presented in a 
random order (race never varied within an array). Each face was labeled underneath as 
“1”, “2”, and “3” from left to right. The faces at test all had neutral expressions (as 
opposed to happy expressions at study) and wore matching red shirts (as opposed to 
street clothes at study) (see Figure 3 for a comparison of faces at study and test). Once a 
face was selected, the number under that face was replaced by “Most Likely,” and 
participants indicated the face they believed to be next most likely to have been seen 
before. They were given the option to reset their choices by pressing “0.” Once the 
second face was selected, it was relabeled “Next Likely,” and the remaining face was 
relabeled “Least Likely.” Once the rankings were complete, the participants pressed 
“Y” to continue to the next trial, or pressed “N” and the arrays were reset. After all 100 
arrays were ranked, participants were debriefed and dismissed.  
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Figure 3. Example of faces used at study and test in Experiment 2. Faces at study (left, 
in figure) were smiling and wearing street clothes. Faces at test (right, in figure) had 
neutral expressions and wore a plain red shirt.  
 
Results  
 To verify the effectiveness of the encoding manipulation, hit rates of weak 
targets and strong targets were compared using a dependent t-test. The hit rate for 
strong targets (M = .61, SD = 0.11) was significantly greater than the hit rate of weak 
targets (M = .45, SD = 0.07) (t(114) = 15.69, p < .001). There were no significant 
differences in hit rates between weak Caucasian faces (M = .45, SD = 0.09) and weak 
African American faces (M = .43, SD = 0.14) (t(114) = 1.67, p = .10), nor were there 
significant differences in hit rates between strong Caucasian faces (M = .61, SD = 0.13) 
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and strong African American faces (M = .60, SD = 0.15) (t(114) = 0.47, p = .64). The 
proportions of targets ranked most, next most, and least likely to have been seen before, 
are reported in Table 1.   
 As in Experiment 1, c2 measures for weak and strong arrays were calculated for 
each participant.  A dependent t-test revealed c2S (M = .61, SD = 0.11) was significantly 
greater than c2W (M = .57, SD = 0.09) (t(114) = 2.38, p = .01). A Wilcoxon signed-rank 
test revealed identical results, with c2S significantly greater than c2W (V = 2379, p = .02). 
Cohen’s effect size (d = 0.31) indicated a small to medium effect. A Bayesian t-test 
using an effect size of .31 revealed only anecdotal evidence (BF = 2.60) for the 
alternative hypothesis.  
Discussion 
 Experiment 2 replicated Experiment 1 (albeit with a smaller effect), further 
supporting a continuous model of memory in facial recognition. By using a mismatch of 
faces between study and test to better approximate an eyewitness decision, this 
experiment provides a more robust test of the mediation involved in facial recognition, 
which allows for a better evaluation of the relative-absolute judgment theory. That is, 
evidence for continuous mediation using a mismatch paradigm suggests that eyewitness 
identification tasks involve continuously mediated processes. However, it is interesting 
that the modification that better approximates the eyewitness situation (i.e., mismatch of 
faces at test and study) mitigated the effect size and Bayesian evidence. This finding 
warrants further investigation, and additional research using closer approximations to 
the true eyewitness task in future studies, an issue we will explore in more detail in the 
General Discussion.  
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General Discussion  
 The goal of these studies was to examine the relative-absolute judgment theory 
proposed by Lindsay and Wells (1985) and Wells et al. (2012) in light of evidence for 
discrete state or continuous mediation in eyewitness-like paradigms. The theory is 
important to examine because of its proliferation in the eyewitness literature and its 
impact on policy decisions. However, because the theory is verbally specified, it is 
challenging to tie formal model of recognition memory to it, as evidenced by the fact 
that both continuous and discrete-state mediation appear germane to different 
instantiations of the theory. The current studies found evidence of continuous mediation 
in an eyewitness-like situation using the simultaneous presentation of options. These 
results raise questions regarding the processes posited by at least one version of the 
relative-absolute judgment theory (Wells et al., 2012). Our evidence suggests that 
continuous processes mediate simultaneous lineups, and that a ‘know it or you guess’ 
explanation is problematic2.  
It is important to note, however, that one could conceptualize a different kind of 
“guessing” process given continuous mediation that is distinct from a discrete-state 
																																																						
2 Because the relative-absolute judgment strategy may allow for a mixture of discrete 
and continuous processes, one could suppose that the c2 paradigm will only find 
evidence supporting discrete mediation when the relevant processes on all trials are 
purely discrete. In a new experiment similar to Experiment 2, we had participants report 
their confidence in their first choice. Even when we limited our c2 calculation to only 
those trials in which participants reported being highly confident in the choice ranked 
first, we found the same c2 advantage (c2S = .63, c2W = .56). One would think that if 
discrete mediation was ever occurring, it would occur more often for these high 
confidence decisions. That is, a participant might reason that, because he or she is 
certain that the face ranked first is a previously studied face, a participant would 
arbitrarily assign ranks to the remaining alternatives. But we found this was not the 
case, suggesting that even arrays involving high-confidence rankings were processed 
continuously.  
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conceptualization. For example, if the memory strength arising from two faces (in our 
three-person arrays) elicit essentially identical levels of evidence, a participant would 
have to choose one over the other. But this type of guessing is different because 
evidence about these stimuli is available (i.e., is nonzero), it just happens to be of equal 
value; discrete-state mediation assumes guessing based on zero mnemonic information. 
Although a “tie” is conceivable in an eyewitness identification task, the witness faced 
with that situation likely chooses not to endorse either individual rather than guessing 
arbitrarily between them.  
If our evidence against a reliance on lucky guesses (guessing with zero 
mnemonic information) is correct, it is discrediting to eyewitnesses and misleading to 
policymakers to state that some ostensibly correct eyewitness decisions arise from 
guessing. In contrast, according to the continuous mediation perspective, ID decisions 
are made at differing levels of confidence. Consequently, rather than choosing an 
identification procedure that purportedly reduces guessing (the sequential lineup), 
policymakers instead should determine the confidence level below which an ID 
decision is considered too unreliable: Not because low-confidence decisions are more 
likely to have arisen from a guess, but because as confidence decreases, accuracy 
decreases (e.g., Palmer et al., 2013; Wixted et al., 2015). 
Other Tests of Relative Judgment Theory 
 Clark’s (2003) WITNESS model has been used to explore other aspects of 
relative-absolute judgment theory. For example, Clark and Gronlund (2015) offered an 
alternative explanation for the primary evidence offered in favor of a reliance on 
relative judgments (Wells, 1993; see also Clark & Davey, 2005). Wells (1993) 
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randomly assigned participants to view either a target present lineup or a target removed 
lineup (a lineup from which the guilty suspect was removed and not replaced). Wells 
argued that if witnesses are making absolute judgments, those who could have 
identified the guilty suspect, had he been present, should reject the target removed 
lineup because the guilty suspect is not present. However, if witnesses are making 
relative judgments, those witnesses who could have selected the guilty suspect will 
exhibit what is referred to as a target-to-foil shift, and instead select the next best option 
from the target removed lineup. Wells found that most participants did not reject the 
target removed lineup, and instead shifted their choices to the fillers. They interpreted 
this finding as evidence that simultaneous lineup decisions were made using relative 
judgments, as defined by relative-absolute judgment theory (Wells, 1984; Lindsay & 
Wells, 1985). But Clark and Gronlund (2015) fit the Wells (1993) data (using the 
WITNESS model) using an absolute decision process, which suggests that a target-to-
foil shift is not proof of the use of a relative judgment strategy in simultaneous lineups. 
Clark and Gronlund offered an alternative explanation based on continuous mediation. 
Whenever at least two lineup members have strength values above a decision criterion, 
then the “next-best” lineup member would be chosen if the best match was removed 
from the lineup.  
A second example of utilizing WITNESS to formally evaluate an idea based on 
the relative judgment theory involves a phenomenon Wells et al. (2015) called “filler 
siphoning.” According to this idea, simultaneous lineups result in superior performance 
compared to showups (one-person ID procedures) because witnesses make relative 
judgments among lineup choices, “siphoning” choices away from an innocent suspect, 
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thereby reducing the number of false IDs of an innocent suspect. In response to Wells et 
al., Wetmore et al. (under review) used WITNESS to conduct a theory space 
exploration of filler siphoning comparing amongst showups, 3-, 6-, and 12-person 
lineups. Wetmore et al. found that adding lineup fillers did not affect discriminability of 
lineups (relative to showups) in most circumstances, suggesting that some other 
mechanism is responsible for the lineup superiority found in the literature. Only when 
fillers closely matched the perpetrator in appearance did Wetmore et al. find that fillers 
provided “protection” compared to a showup: Only in this situation did fillers “steal” 
more choices from the innocent suspect than the guilty suspect, resulting in superior 
lineup performance.  
It is important to note that concerns our data have raised regarding relative 
judgments refer to the theory proposed by Wells and colleagues. Our data should not be 
construed as an indictment of the act of comparing faces in a lineup. In fact, comparing 
faces may have beneficial effects on eyewitness performance. Wixted and Mickes 
(2014) proposed a SDT-based model that posits that witnesses use distinguishing, 
diagnostic features of lineup members to inform their choices. In a simultaneous lineup, 
witnesses compare amongst fillers, not because they are unable to detect the target, but 
in order to eliminate shared features that are not diagnostic. For example, if all lineup 
members have brown hair, witnesses should not use that feature to inform their 
decision. The diagnostic-feature theory can also explain how witnesses approach 
sequential lineups. When faces are not presented all at once, witnesses have a difficult 
time determining which features are diagnostic. As the sequential lineup unfolds, 
however, witnesses can begin to discern which features are shared by all lineup 
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members viewed so far (non-diagnostic), and which features are potentially unique to 
the perpetrator. This is one reason why sequential lineup performance sometimes 
matches simultaneous lineup performance (e.g., Gronlund et al., 2012) if the suspect 
(guilty or innocent) is positioned later in the sequential lineup (Carlson, Gronlund, & 
Clark, 2008; Gronlund, Carlson, Dailey, & Goodsell, 2009; for a similar explanation for 
sequential position effects see Goodsell, Gronlund, & Carlson, 2010). But a 
determination of whether (or when) eyewitnesses make comparative judgments among 
faces in a lineup can only be made when the component processes are formally 
specified and clear-cut predictions can be derived.  
Future Directions  
 There is a good deal of variability in the c2 measures in our sample (as was the 
case in Kellen & Klauer, 2014, see their Figure 4). Some participants displayed patterns 
that mimicked discrete state mediation. Although this could be statistical noise, as 
would be expected when considering a small portion of trials (i.e., misses), it is also 
possible that some participants adopt strategies during the ranking procedure that 
produce discrete state c2 patterns. Recently, Kellen and Klauer (2015) found evidence 
for discrete state mediation using a similar paradigm to Kellen and Klauer (2014), 
except that confidence ratings of individual items replaced the ranking judgments for 
arrays of items. It appears that the task (confidence ratings rather than ranking 
judgments) can cause participants to adopt a discrete strategy. A study using confidence 
ratings should be done to determine if the same pattern holds for faces. Kellen et al. (in 
press) also found that Luce’s (1963) discrete low-threshold model fit the Kellen and 
Klauer (2014) as well as did a continuous SDT model. Clearly, more work needs to be 
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done to understand the c2 paradigm, as well as determine what factors, or strategies, 
affect when recognition memory is found to be continuously or discretely mediated. 
These include factors that distinguish an eyewitness situation from the typical 
laboratory study. 
 Experiment 2 was our first foray into better approximating an eyewitness 
situation, and the mismatch of faces from study to test mitigated the c2 differences 
between strong and weak items. That is, Experiment 1 had a Cohen’s d of .54 and 
substantial evidence for the alternative hypothesis (BF = 5.86) while Experiment 2 had 
a smaller Cohen’s d of .31 and only anecdotal evidence for the alternative hypothesis 
(BF = 2.60). One possible explanation of the decreasing effect size may have arose due 
to perceived task differences: Experiment 1 is a simple matching task (the photos from 
study to test were identical) whereas Experiment 2 requires a participant to make a 
determination whether this different photo corresponds to the person studied previously. 
The matching task in Experiment 1 seems amenable to weighing memorial evidence 
against a simple criterion (continuous processing). Experiment 2, on the other hand, 
because it is more difficult cognitively, may engender more than just a matching 
process. And if there is more than simple evidence-weighing going on, it could mitigate 
the c2 results in Experiment 2. More work is needed to understand this possible task 
complexity effect, which can be achieved, in part, by follow-up experiments that more 
closely approximate the eyewitness situation.  
How will other factors that characterize the eyewitness task influence the degree 
of continuous versus discrete mediation? For example, the current studies randomly 
selected the fillers in each array so that each participant would not see the same array 
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composition as other participants. However, in an eyewitness situation, fillers are not 
chosen at random, but rather matched to the description of the suspect in order to 
increase lineup fairness. This prevents a suspect from standing out amongst the fillers. 
Future studies using the c2 paradigm could construct arrays that varied in fairness, and 
evaluate how this factor impacts memory mediation. If the target stands out from the 
fillers (biased), participants may adopt a discrete-like strategy, whereby the “obvious” 
target is ranked as first, and remaining choices are distributed arbitrarily. In unbiased 
arrays, on the other hand, where faces closely resemble one another, participants 
 may have to adopt a more continuous strategy in order to properly differentiate among 
the faces.   
 Another way to better approximate the eyewitness situation is to introduce the 
presence of innocent suspects via target absent arrays. In the current studies, all arrays 
were target present, and participants were aware of this composition. However, the 
knowledge that some arrays do not contain targets may invite more participants to more 
consistently adopt continuously-mediated strategies, reducing the percentage of 
participants whose summary data strayed from the average. Fair lineups and target 
absent situations are commonplace in the eyewitness literature (Clark et al., 2008; 
Fitzgerald et al., 2013), and if patterns of c2 integrating these variables continue to 
support continuous mediation of facial recognition, it will further strengthen the case 
that continuous evidence mediates eyewitness identification.  
Conclusions  
 We found evidence that facial recognition is mediated by continuous processes 
using a test with minimal assumptions. But Kellen and Klauer (2015) found evidence 
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for discrete state mediation when confidence ratings were made (with verbal stimuli). 
These seemingly disparate results point to the need for more work to understand the 
circumstances that influence the direct mapping, or discretization, of memory evidence 
in recognition memory, especially given the call for the use of confidence judgments to 
construct ROC curves to assess eyewitness performance (Gronlund, Wixted, & Mickes, 
2014; Wixted & Mickes, 2012). 
 However, the main goal of our studies was to examine the relative-absolute 
judgment theory (Lindsay & Wells, 1985; Wells, 1984; Wells et al., 2012) by mapping 
the theory onto formal discrete and continuous conceptualizations of facial recognition 
memory. We used a critical test developed by Kellen and Klauer (2014) and found 
evidence for continuous mediation, a finding that requires the reexamination of the 
relative-absolute judgment theory. As we have noted, we are not the first to raise 
concerns about this theory (e.g., Clark & Gronlund, 2015), or phenomena the theory has 
been used to explain (e.g., filler siphoning, Wetmore et al., under review). It is our view 
that a more productive approach toward future theorizing in eyewitness identification 
should involve formally specified models (also see Clark, 2008) that explain a wide 
range of eyewitness phenomena (e.g., the WITNESS model, Clark, 2003; the diagnostic 
feature model, Wixted & Mickes, 2014). Understanding the mechanisms underlying 
eyewitness identification is of paramount importance. If we can better understand the 
processes governing an eyewitness decision, we can better inform policymakers 
regarding how eyewitness evidence should be collected and utilized by the criminal 
justice system.  
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